North African Campaign
With the campaign in East Africa over, Robertson returned to Mombasa on 17 July, and then flew to Cairo in August, where he became Administrative Chief of the South African Defence Force in the Middle East, with the rank of brigadier. However, Cunningham was forming a new headquarters, which was called Western Army on 11 September, and renamed Eighth Army on 27 September, and he asked Robertson to become AQMG. Robertson readily accepted, even though it meant dropping in rank back to lieutenant-colonel, but a request to South Africa to release him for this duty met with a refusal from the Chief of the General Staff of the UDF. When his deputy visited Cairo, Cunningham and the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, approached him and asked for Robertson's release, which had the desired effect. He was formally seconded as AQMG on 19 September, with Brigadier Charles Miller as his superior, the Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General (DA&QMG).
The immediate task was preparing for Operation Crusader, the Eighth Army's offensive against the German and Italian army in Libya. The maintenance of its
118,000 men and 17,600 vehicles required 8,000 long tons (8,100 t) of supplies per day. The railway was extended from Mersa Matruh to Bir Mischeifa, and a water pipeline was extended forward of Mersa Matruh. Over 150,000 imperial gallons (680,000 L) of water was stored in the forward area, and three forward bases were stocked with over 33,000 long tons (34,000 t) of stores. The transport engaged in stocking the forward bases alone consumed 180,000 imperial gallons (820,000 L) per day.
Robertson developed the concept of the Field Maintenance Centre (FMC) for the support of fast-moving mobile operations. An FMC was like a military shopping centre, supplying all the needs of a corps, and dramatically reduced the response time to administrative needs of front line units and reduced the amount of paperwork that they needed to do to get their needs fulfilled. The FMC would later become a feature of war in the desert, and later British logistics in the Normandy Campaign. The offensive was launched on 18 November. While the Germans were taken by surprise, they soon recovered, and pushed the Eighth Army back. On 24 November, the Afrika Korps threatened the railhead at Mischeifa and the Eighth Army's Rear HQ, which Robertson was ordered to defend. Fortunately for him, the Afrika Korps changed direction. But although the tactical situation was poor, the administrative situation remained good, and this influenced Auchinleck to continue the battle. Auchinleck relieved Cunningham of his command, and replaced him with Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie.
The Germans and Italians fell back in December. To support the advance, the ports in Libya needed to be developed. Robertson went to Tobruk on 13 January to investigate increasing its capacity. He concluded that the problem was the poor layout of the depots, and recommended that they be reorganised. Benghazi was captured on 24 December, and became the key port, being much closer to the front than Tobruk. The logistical challenge was to build up sufficient reserves to be able to deliver an attack on the German and Italian positions around El Agheila. On 21 January 1942, the Germans and Italians struck back. Benghazi was abandoned, and the Eighth Army fell back on Gazala. Tobruk was now the main port, but Miller and Robertson considered it too far forward to stock with more than a week's supplies. They were overridden by Auchinleck, who wanted it stocked for a renewed offensive. But the Eighth Army lost the Battle of Gazala, which began on 26 May. On 2 June, Miller became the Eighth Army's Brigadier, General Staff (BGS), and Robertson took his place as DA&QMG, with the rank of brigadier once more. When Tobruk fell on 22 June, 3,000,000 rations, 4,000 long tons (4,100 t) of ammunition and 1,750,000 long tons (1,780,000 t) of petrol, oil and lubricants (POL) were lost. Following another defeat in the Battle of Mersa Matruh, the Eighth Army fell back to El Alamein.
In August 1942, General Harold Alexander replaced Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief Middle East, and Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery became commander of the Eighth Army. Robertson knew both well; Alexander had been a fellow student at Camberley, and Montgomery had been an instructor, having been nominated to attend staff college by Robertson's father. Lieutenant-General Sir Wilfrid Lindsell, the Chief Administrative Officer at Middle East HQ had also been one of his instructors. Robertson was happy to go along with Montgomery's organisation of the staff under which the head of the General Staff branch, Major-General Freddie de Guingand acted as a chief of staff, controlling both administration and operations. Robertson was still permitted direct access to Montgomery when he requested it, a privilege that he did not exercise often. For his part in the earlier campaigns, Robertson was made a Commander of the Order of the British Empire in September. "What gave me confidence," he wrote to his wife, "more than anything else was Monty's attitudes and methods. To watch him on his job is like watching a test match played after watching just good club performance."
Elaborate preparations were made for the Second Battle of El Alamein, not just for the battle itself, but for the subsequent pursuit. Seven days' supplies and 50,000 imperial gallons (230,000 L) of POL for X Corps were stored in forward dumps, along with five days' supplies for XIII Corps and XXX Corps. The forward dumps held 268,000 rounds of 25-pounder, 12,800 rounds of 4.5-inch and 6,400 rounds of 5-5-inch ammunition, together with four days' supply of other ammunition. Three days' supply of stores, ammunition and POL were held at the railhead, and another 14,000 long tons (14,000 t) of ammunition at 4 Advanced Ammunition Depot in Alexandria. On the eve of the battle, Robertson was hospitalised with pneumonia, but he returned to duty on 26 October, to oversee the Eighth Army's pursuit. Tobruk fell on 13 November, and Robertson visited it the following day. The first ship unloaded there on 16 November. Benghazi fell on 20 November, and Tripoli on 21 January 1943. Between 14 and 17 February, Montgomery held a conference in Tripoli on the lessons of the campaign, with lectures from various participants, that was attended by senior British and American officers. Robertson was given two hours to talk about the logistics. His role was also recognised by his being made a Companion of the Order of the Bath on 26 February 1943, and mentioned in despatches. On 28 February, he was promoted to the acting rank of major-general. Considering the lesson of the campaign, Robertson said:An Army Commander clearly is always looking ahead. He wants to know what he can do within the limits of administrative possibilities. The Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General must know sufficient of his administrative situation to be able to give an immediate answer in general terms. It is most important that this administrative answer should be reasonably accurate. On it the general will frame his plan in more detail and give his ideas on the date and weight of the attack. Having said what he is going to do, a commander must not cheat. He must not "beat the pistol" nor "wangle up" additional troops nor sneak his troops further forward than he said he would. A good administrative officer does not over-issue and cannot be cheated without unfortunate consequences. Some generals have no morals. Fortunately General Montgomery does not cheat – whether that is due to his innate honesty or the fact that I watch him like a cat does not matter – and moreover, he does not let other people cheat.
At this point, headquarters of the Eighth Army and the Desert Air Force were 1,000 miles (1,600 km) from the railhead at Tobruk, and 1,200 miles (1,900 km) from GHQ Middle East in Cairo, making day-to-day coordination on logistical matters very difficult. A new staff known as HQ Tripolitania Base (or Tripbase) was created under Robertson in February 1943, and assumed responsibility for Tripolitania on 3 March. Eighth Army now sent maintenance requests to Tripolitania Base, which in turn dealt with GHQ. This meant that Robertson now received his orders from his successor at Eighth Army, Brigadier Miles Graham, who had previously been his subordinate. As commander of the Tripolitania Base, he supported the Tunisian Campaign, and was involved in the planning and execution of the Allied invasion of Sicily.
