Battle of Isandlwana

Background

Following the scheme by which Lord Carnarvon had brought about the Confederation of Canada through the 1867 British North America Act, it was thought that a similar plan might succeed in South Africa and in 1877 Sir Henry Bartle Frere was appointed as High Commissioner for Southern Africa to instigate the scheme. Some of the obstacles to such a plan were the presence of the independent states of the South African Republic and the Kingdom of Zululand, both of which the British Empire would attempt to overcome by force of arms.

Bartle Frere, on his own initiative, without the approval of the British government and with the intent of instigating a war with the Zulu, had presented an ultimatum to the Zulu king Cetshwayo on 11 December 1878 with which the Zulu king could not possibly comply. When the ultimatum expired a month later, Bartle Frere ordered Lord Chelmsford to proceed with an invasion of Zululand, for which plans had already been made.

Prelude

Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand consisting of over 16,500 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle, slip around the British and over the Tugela, and strike at Natal. Lord Chelmsford settled on three invading columns with the main centre column, now consisting of some 7,800 men, under his direct command. The centre column comprised No. 3 Column, commanded by Colonel Richard Thomas Glyn, and Colonel Anthony Durnford's No. 2 Column. Chelmsford moved his troops from Pietermaritzburg to a forward camp at Helpmekaar, past Greytown. On 9 January 1879 they moved to Rorke's Drift, and early on 11 January commenced crossing the Buffalo River into Zululand.

The backbone of the British force under Lord Chelmsford consisted of twelve regular infantry companies: six each of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, the 24th Regiment of Foot (which was subsequently renamed the South Wales Borderers). These were regarded as hardened and reliable troops. In addition, there were approximately 2,500 local African auxiliaries of the Natal Native Contingent, many of whom were exiled or refugee Zulu. They were led by European officers, but were considered generally of poor quality by the British as they were prohibited from using their traditional fighting technique and inadequately trained in the European method as well as being indifferently armed. Also, there were some irregular colonial cavalry units, and a detachment of artillery consisting of six field guns and several Congreve rockets. Adding on wagon drivers, camp followers and servants, there were around 4,700 men in the No. 3 Column, and around 3,100 men in the No. 2 Column that composed the main centre column. Colonel Anthony Durnford took charge of No. 2 Column with orders to stay on the defensive near the Middle Drift of the Tugela River. Because of the urgency required to accomplish their scheme, Bartle Frere and Chelmsford began the invasion during the rainy season. This had the consequence of slowing the British advance to a crawl.

The Zulu army, while a product of a warrior culture, was essentially a militia force which could be called out in time of national danger. It had a very limited logistical capacity and could only stay in the field a few weeks before the troops would be obliged to return to their civilian duties. Zulu warriors were armed primarily with assegai thrusting spears, known in Zulu as iklwa, knobkierrie clubs, some throwing spears and shields made of cowhide. The Zulu warrior, his regiment and the army drilled in the personal and tactical use and coordination of this weapons system. Some Zulus also had old muskets and antiquated rifles stockpiled, a relatively few of which were carried by Zulu impi. However, their marksmanship was very poor, quality and supply of powder and shot dreadful, maintenance non-existent and attitude towards firearms summed up in the observation that: "The generality of Zulu warriors, however, would not have firearms – the arms of a coward, as they said, for they enable the poltroon to kill the brave without awaiting his attack." The British had timed the invasion to coincide with the harvest, intending to catch the Zulu warrior-farmers dispersed. Fortunately for Cetshwayo, the Zulu army had already begun to assemble at Ulundi, as it did every year for the First Fruits ceremony when all warriors were duty-bound to report to their regimental barracks near Ulundi.

Battle

The Zulu Army was commanded by Umtwana (Prince) Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza and Umtwana Mavumengwana kaNdlela Ntuli. The inDuna Dabulamanzi kaMpande, half brother of Cetshwayo, commanded the Undi Corps after Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, the regular inkhosi, or commander, was wounded.

While Chelmsford was in the field seeking them, the entire Zulu army had outmanoeuvred him, moving behind his force with the intention of attacking the British Army on 23 January. Pulleine had received reports of large forces of Zulus throughout the morning of 22 January from 8:00am on. Vedettes had observed Zulus on the hills to the left front, and Lt. Chard, while he was at the camp, observed a large force of several thousand Zulu moving to the British left around the hill of Isandlwana. Pulleine sent word to Chelmsford, which was received by the general between 9:00 am and 10:00 am. The main Zulu force was discovered at around 11:00 am by men of Lt. Charles Raw's troop of scouts, who chased a number of Zulus into a valley, only then seeing most of the 20,000 men of the main enemy force sitting in total quiet. This valley has generally been thought to be the Ngwebeni some 7 miles (11 km) from the British camp but may have been closer in the area of the spurs of Nqutu hill. Having been discovered, the Zulu force leapt to the offensive. Raw's men began a fighting retreat back to the camp, and a messenger was sent to warn Pulleine.

The Zulu adopted their traditional pitched battle formation, known as the 'horns and chest of the buffalo', with the aim of encircling the British position. From Pulleine's vantage point in the camp, at first only the right horn and then the chest (centre) of the attack seemed to be developing. Pulleine sent out first one, then all six companies of the 24th Foot into an extended firing line, with the aim of meeting the Zulu attack head-on and checking it with firepower. Durnford's men, upon meeting elements of the Zulu centre, had retreated to a donga, a dried-out watercourse, on the British right flank where they formed a defensive line. The rocket battery under Durnford's command, which was not mounted and dropped behind the rest of the force, was isolated and overrun very early in the engagement. The two battalions of native troops were in Durnford's line; while all their British officers and NCOs carried rifles, only one in 10 of the native soldiers under their command had a firearm, and those few weapons were muzzle-loading muskets with limited ammunition. Many of the native troops began to leave the battlefield at this point.

Solar eclipse

There was a solar eclipse on that day, at 2:30 pm. An officer in advance of Chelmsford's force gave this eyewitness account of the final stage of the battle at about 3:00 pm:

In a few seconds we distinctly saw the guns fired again, one after the other, sharp. This was done several times – a pause, and then a flash – flash! The sun was shining on the camp at the time, and then the camp looked dark, just as if a shadow was passing over it. The guns did not fire after that, and in a few minutes all the tents had disappeared.

Nearly the same moment is described in a Zulu warrior's account.

The sun turned black in the middle of the battle; we could still see it over us, or should have thought we had been fighting till evening. Then we got into the camp, and there was a great deal of smoke and firing. Afterwards the sun came out bright again.

Zulu victory

The presence of large numbers of bodies grouped together suggests the resistance was more protracted than originally thought, and a number of desperate last stands were made. Evidence shows that many of the bodies, today marked by cairns, were found in several large groups around the camp – including one stand of around 150 men. A Zulu account describes a group of the 24th forming a square on the neck of Isandlwana. Colonial cavalry, the NMP and the carabiniers, who could easily have fled as they had horses, died around Durnford in his last stand, while nearby their horses were found dead on their picket rope. What is clear is that the slaughter was complete in the area around the camp and back to Natal along the Fugitive's Drift. The fighting had been hand-to-hand combat and no quarter was given to the British wounded. The Zulus had been commanded to ignore the civilians in black coats and this meant that some officers, whose patrol dress was dark blue and black at the time, were spared and escaped.

Once their ammunition had been expended, surviving British soldiers had no choice but to fight on with bayonet and rifle butt. A Zulu account relates the single-handed fight by the guard of Chelmsford's tent, a big Irishman of the 24th who kept the Zulus back with his bayonet until he was speared and the general's Union flag captured. Both the colours of the 2nd 24th were lost, while the Queen's colour of the 1st 24th was carried off the field by Lieutenant Melvill on horseback but lost when he crossed the river, despite Lieutenant Coghill having come to his aid. Both Melvill and Coghill were killed after crossing the river, and received posthumous Victoria Crosses in 1907 as the legend of their gallantry grew, and, after twenty-seven years of steady campaigning by the late Mrs. Melvill (who had died in 1906), on the strength of Queen Victoria being quoted as saying that 'if they had survived they would have been awarded the Victoria Cross'. Garnet Wolseley, who replaced Chelmsford, felt otherwise at the time and stated, "I don't like the idea of officers escaping on horseback when their men on foot are being killed."

Of the 1,800-plus force of British troops and African auxiliaries, over 1,300 were killed, most of them Europeans, including field commanders Pulleine and Durnford. Only five Imperial officers survived (including Lieutenants Henry Curling and Horace Smith-Dorrien), and of the 52 officers lost, 21 came from the 24th Foot. Amongst those killed was Surgeon Major Peter Shepherd, a first-aid pioneer. The Natal Native Contingent lost some 400 men, and there were 240 lost from the group of 249 amaChunu African auxiliaries. Perhaps the last to die was Gabangaye, the portly chief of the amaChunu Natal Native Contingent, who was given over to be killed by the udibi (porter or carrier) boys. The captured Natal Native Contingent soldiers were regarded as traitors by the Zulu and executed.

Order of battle

The following order of battle was arrayed on the day.

British forces

Commanding Officer: Brevet Colonel Anthony Durnford, RE

Staff – 2 officers, 1 NCO

11th/7th Brigade, Royal Artillery – 1 officer, 9 NCOs and men with a rocket battery (3 rocket troughs)

Natal Native Horse (5 troops) – 5 officers, c. 259 NCOs and men

1st/1st Natal Native Contingent (2 companies) – 7 officers, c. 240 NCOs and men

2nd/1st Natal Native Contingent – 1 NCO

Commanding Officer: Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine, 1st/24th Foot

Staff – 6 officers, 14 NCOs and men

N/5th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery – 2 officers, 70 NCOs and men with two 7-pounder (3-inch) mountain guns deployed as field guns

5th Field Company, Royal Engineers – 3 men

1st/24th Regiment of Foot (2nd Warwickshire) (5 companies) – 14 officers, 450 NCOs and men

2nd/24th Regiment of Foot (2nd Warwickshire) (1 company) – 5 officers, 150 NCOs and men

90th Regiment of Foot (Perthshire Light Infantry) – 10 men

Army Service Corps – 3 men

Army Hospital Corps – 1 officer, 10 NCOs and men

Imperial Mounted Infantry (1 squadron) – 28 NCOs and men

Zulu forces

uDududu, uNokenke regiments, part uNodwengu corps – 3,000 to 4,000 men

umCijo, uKhandampevu, regiments; part uNodwengu corps – 7,000 to 9,000 men

INgobamakhosi, uMbonambi, uVe regiments – 5,000 to 6,000 men

Undi corps, uDloko, iNdluyengwe, Indlondlo and Uthulwana regiments – 4,000 to 5,000 men

Aftermath

Analysis

The Zulus avoided the dispersal of their main fighting force and concealed the advance and location of this force until they were within a few hours' striking distance of the British. When the location of the main Zulu Impi was discovered by British scouts, the Zulus immediately advanced and attacked, achieving tactical surprise. The British, although they now had some warning of a Zulu advance, were unable to concentrate their central column. It also left little time and gave scant information for Pulleine to organise the defence. The Zulus had outmanoeuvred Chelmsford and their victory at Isandlwana was complete and forced the main British force to retreat out of Zululand until a far larger British Army could be shipped to South Africa for a second invasion.

Recent historians, notably Lock and Quantrill in Zulu Victory, argue that from the Zulu perspective the theatre of operations included the diversions around Magogo Hills and Mangeni Falls and that these diversions, which drew more than half of Chelmsford's forces away from Isandlwana, were deliberate. Also, the main Zulu force was not unexpectedly discovered in their encampment but was fully deployed and ready to advance on the British camp. These historians' view of the expanded battlefield considers Chelmsford to have been the overall commander of the British forces and that responsibility for the defeat lies firmly with him.

Debate persists as to how and why the British lost the battle. Many arguments focus on possible local tactical occurrences, as opposed to the strategic lapses and failings in grand tactics on the part of high command under Bartle Frere and Chelmsford. Still, the latter comes under scrutiny for mistakes that may have led directly to the British defeat. The initial view, reported by Horace Smith-Dorrien, was that the British had difficulty unpacking their ammunition boxes fast enough stating, "The box lids were screwed down, the screws were rusty and difficult to remove, there were too few screwdrivers, standing orders insisted that until a box was empty, no other boxes were to be opened, and the quartermasters were reluctant to distribute ammunition to units other than their own." Well-equipped and well-trained British soldiers could fire 10–12 rounds a minute. The lack of ammunition caused a lull in the defence and, in subsequent engagements with the Zulus, ammunition boxes were unscrewed in advance for rapid distribution.

Donald Morris in The Washing of the Spears argues that the men, fighting too far from the camp, ran out of ammunition, starting first with Durnford's men who were holding the right flank and who had been in action longer, which precipitated a slowdown in the rate of fire against the Zulus. This argument suggests that the ammunition was too far from the firing line and that the 70 rounds each man took to the firing line were not sufficient. A different view, supported with evidence from the battlefield, such as Ian Knight and Lt. Colonel Snook's works, (the latter having written How Can Man Die Better?), suggests that, although Durnford's men probably did run out of ammunition, the majority of men in the firing line did not. The discovery of the British line so far out from the camp has led Ian Knight to conclude that the British were defending too large a perimeter.

Recriminations

Chelmsford realised that he would need to account to the government and to history for the disaster. He quickly fixed blame on Durnford, claiming Durnford disobeyed his orders to fix a proper defensive camp, although there is no evidence such an order was issued and there would hardly have been time for Durnford to entrench. Further, it had been Chelmsford's decision not to entrench the camp, as it was meant to be temporary.

Wolseley wrote on 30 September 1879 when, later in the war, the Prince Imperial of France was killed by the Zulu: "I think this is very unfair, and is merely a repetition of what was done regarding the Isandlwana disaster where the blame was thrown upon Durnford, the real object in both instances being apparently to screen Chelmsford."

Some historians hold that the victory at Ulundi was a token one, driven by the need for Lord Chelmsford to salvage some success after Isandhlwana, and the British withdrew quickly followed by Chelmsford's resignation as commander of the British forces. The end of the war saw the Zulu retaining their lands.

Media

African Litany, the second album by Johnny Clegg and his band Juluka, containing the track "Impi" about this battle.

Zulu Dawn, a 1979 American adventure war film about the Battle of Isandlwana.

Zulu, a 1964 British epic historical film which depicts the aftermath of the Battle of Isandlwana in the opening scene.